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Abstract
The fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and several studies suggest that climate
change is expected to increase food insecurity and poverty in many parts of the world. In this paper, we adopt a
microeconometric approach to empirically estimate the impact of climate change-induced hikes in cereal prices on
household welfare in Swaziland (also Kingdom of Eswatini). We do so first by econometrically estimating expenditure
and price elasticities of five food groups consumed by households in Swaziland using the Almost Ideal Demand System
(AIDS), based on data from the 2009/2010 Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure Survey. Second, we use the
estimated expenditure and compensated elasticities from the AIDS model, food shares from the household survey, and
food price projections developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to estimate the proportion-
ate increase in income required to maintain the level of household utility that would have prevailed absent an increase in
food prices. Our results show increases in cereal prices due to climate change are expected to double extreme poverty in
urban areas and increase poverty in rural areas of the country to staggering levels - between 71 and 75%, compared to
63% before the price changes. Income transfers of between 17.5 and 25.4% of pre-change expenditures are needed to
avoid the welfare losses.
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1 Introduction
The fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC 2014) concluded that human interfer-
ence with the climate system is occurring, and climate change
poses risks for human and natural systems alike.1 The 2014
report also serves as one of the first efforts by IPCC to present
a case for the impact of climate change on poverty. Several
other studies have addressed the nexus between climate
change, food production, and poverty in developing
countries. For example, a review by Hertel and Rosch
(2010) of research studies using crop growth simulation
models and statistical estimations of climate change effects
indicates that rising temperatures are expected to
significantly reduce cereal yields in low income countries
with an attendant increase in household poverty. Results of
climate simulations up to 2080 in Onyutha (2019) point to a
similar conclusion about the linkage between food insecurity
and poverty; thermal environments under future climatic con-
ditions are expected to result in losses in arable land and
1 The conclusion from the AR5 report of the IPCC is that “human influence on
the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread
impacts on human and natural systems.”
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agricultural output in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). Other related studies focus on the relationship between
food prices and poverty through the lens of climate change
(e.g., Mkhawani et al. 2016; Seaman et al. 2014; Vermeulen
et al. 2012; Brinkman et al. 2010; Baiphethi and Jacobs 2009).
Seaman et al. (2014) use a simulation method, the Household
Economy Approach, to assess the vulnerability of households
to large shocks in cereal prices and production prompted by
climate change on household poverty inMalawi and Namibia.
In their review of scientific studies about the effects of climate
change on food systems, Vermeulen et al. (2012) indicate that
climate change will slow down poverty reduction gains in
developing countries in part by undermining risk mitigation
strategies, investments in agriculture, and through increased
food prices which disproportionately affect poor households.
In a similar realm, Brinkman et al. (2010) find, not surprising-
ly, that higher food prices are associated with a reduction in
the diversity and frequency of food consumption in Haiti,
Nepal, and Niger using a regression model and data
collected by the World Food Programme between 2006 and
2008. Baiphethi and Jacobs (2009) discuss changing trends in
food supply channels in South Africa–how the infiltration of
supermarkets into rural areas has served to lower food prices
due to scale economies–and how government subsidies in
Southern Africa can improve yields, lower food prices and
enhance food security among vulnerable households. A spe-
cial issue in the Journal Environment and Development
Economics (Hallegatte et al. 2018) was devoted to the topic
of poverty and climate change. It featured in-depth analyses of
the heterogeneous impacts of climate change by income and
exposure to environmental shocks at the household level.
Climate change can affect poverty in several ways, includ-
ing displacement and migration because of climate hazards,
impact on food prices, and increased poverty traps through
extreme weather events such as pronounced droughts. These
channels are interconnected in that displacement and migra-
tion from rural areas can lead to reduced agricultural produc-
tion in said areas, which can spur an increase in food prices.
Likewise, an increased likelihood of flooding or drought and
lengthening of growing seasons can prompt an increase in real
prices as well (Thornton et al. 2010).2 In many SSA countries,
extreme patterns of climate have the potential to significantly
diminish agricultural output (Onyutha 2019; Onyutha 2018),
hence worsening the imbalance between supply and demand
of food products in the face of fast population growth and low
productivity (Ivanic andMartin 2008; Nelson et al. 2010). The
regularity of agricultural shocks resulting from extreme
weather events in the past decade has led to a rise in food
prices which, in turn, has negatively affected most con-
sumers and some producers in the food chain, including
farmers, traders of agricultural products, and food manu-
facturers (Terazono 2014). Wheeler and von Braun (2013)
contend that climate change can reverse the gains realized
towards the world’s goal of eliminating hunger as it re-
duces the production of crops resulting in increased
poverty.
Like many SSA countries, agriculture is a key source of
income in Swaziland, with about 75% of the population en-
gaged in subsistence agriculture on drought-prone land (Burki
et al. 2012). More than 50% of the arable land in the country is
used to grow cereal with a high of 70% in 2014.3 According to
Mavuso et al. (2015), climate change has resulted in unreliable
rainfall patterns, shifted crop growing seasons, and produced
very high summer temperatures and dried wetlands. Mavuso
et al. (2015) also argued that an increase in food prices would
likely cause lower-income net consumers to trade-off neces-
sary nutritious food for lower cost and less nutritious food.
Potentially resulting in malnutrition in children and associated
irreversible long-term effects. The real costs of using substi-
tute food commodities with lower nutrients will only show at a
later stage as the individuals’ immune system weakens, and
the mortality rate increases (Wodon and Zaman 2010).
According to the World Bank, 39.7% of the population lived
under the international $1.90 poverty line in 2016 and 2017.4
Together, these statistics illustrate the vulnerability of Swazi
households to the effects of climate change. According to the
World Food Programme Swaziland Country Brief (August
2017), the food security situation in Swaziland was severely
impacted by the 2016/2017 El Nino drought. Production of
maize was 64% less than the previous five-year average pro-
duction in the country that year.5 Food prices also remained
significantly higher than before the drought.6 They estimated
that because of the 2016/17 drought, about 159,000 people
would need food assistance due to a combination of reduced
income opportunities and poor agricultural performance, lead-
ing to high reliance on purchases and relatively high food
prices.
More closely related to our study are the papers by
Dessus et al. (2008), Hertel et al. (2010), and Seaman
et al. (2014). Using a similar microeconomic framework
as ours, Dessus et al. (2008) provide “back of the enve-
lope” estimates of the effects of the increase in world food
2 The 2006/2007 food price crisis represents an acute reminder of the impact
of climate change on vital commodity prices. One of the two major causes of
the 2006/2007 food price spike was droughts in grain-producing nations. “The
World Food Crisis”. The New York Times. 10 April 2008. Retrieved 29
July 2011.




5 Authors calculation using data from https://www.indexmundi.com/
agriculture/?country=sz&commodity=corn&graph=production. Accessed
2019.08.19
6 Their study concluded that the “most affected population groups are the poor
who have lost their crops and have seen their income reduced due to chronic
illness or death of bread winner and loss of employment”.
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prices that started in 2005 on urban poverty in 72 devel-
oping countries. The authors conclude that a growth rate
of gross domestic product (GDP) between 0.2 and 3% is
required to offset the effect of increased food prices on
urban poverty. Unlike our study, however, they do not
focus on the impact of climate change, nor do they esti-
mate country-specific substitution elasticities. Instead,
they rely on estimates in Seale et al. (2003) to obtain food
budget shares and substitution elasticities at the country-
level. Hertel et al. (2010) and Seaman et al. (2014), on the
other hand, explore the effects of climate change on pov-
erty through increased agricultural prices. Hertel et al.
(2010) estimates the impacts of agricultural productivity
shocks on poverty using the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) general equilibrium global trade model
and its accompanying database. Seaman et al. (2014) ap-
plied the Household Economy Approach, which relies on
a defined reference period in which conditions are known
(i.e., a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ year). They used it to estimate the
expected change in a household’s food access from a
shock or change in a current ‘prediction’ year, factoring
in the amount of food and non-food goods which the
household should be able to obtain, and the types and
acceptable use of ‘coping’ strategies.7 In contrast to these
two simulation studies, we adopt an econometric ap-
proach based on a microeconomic food demand model
to study the impact of climate change on poverty at the
household level. In addition to disrupting the production
cycle, one potential major effects of climate shocks, espe-
cially on poor households, is on consumption. Climate
shocks destabilize consumption patterns of poor house-
holds more so than wealthier households because wealth-
ier households can sell off assets to help smooth con-
sumption while the poor households generally cannot
(Hoddinott 2006; Carter et al. 2007; Carter and Lybbert
2012).
The key contribution of this paper is the study of the impact
of climate shocks on poverty through consumption expendi-
ture patterns of households using an empirical framework
grounded on economic theory. We implement our two-step
micro econometric model to quantify the change in household
welfare due to climate-induced commodity price increases.
Our empirical results for Swaziland suggest that while SSA
countries contribute significantly less to climate change, they
could bear the brunt of it in terms of increased incidence of
poverty and economic decline. Our analysis provides impor-
tant insights for targeted policy interventions such as social
protection or compensation for households most vulnerable to
the effects of climate change.
2 Background and literature review
The Kingdom of Swaziland is a landlocked country bordered
by Mozambique on the east and South Africa along the north,
south, and west of the country. The country is characterized by
varying monthly average temperatures with warm to hot sum-
mers ranging between 19 and 26 degrees Celsius and winter
temperatures between 13 degrees and 20 degrees Celsius.8
The country’s climate is characterized by seasonal rainfall that
varies at higher altitudes from 1000 mm to 1600 mm and
between 500 mm and 600 mm in the lower areas. The country
has a wide variety of habitats and significant variations in flora
and fauna.
Swaziland is divided into four administrative regions:
Hhohho in the north, Manzini in the center, Shiselweni in
the south, and Lubombo in the east. Each administrative re-
gion consists of regional councils made up of 10 chiefdoms
(Mwendera 2006). The Kingdom also has six physiographic
zones grouped by elevation, geology, landforms, soils, and
vegetation.
In 2010, Swaziland’s emission inventory was 0.8MtCO2e,
which represents 0.002% of global emissions (Swaziland's
INDC-Final-UNFCCC 2005). Overall, Africa is responsible
for less than 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Sy
2016); yet, climate change is viewed as a serious threat to
economic growth in Africa because of the reliance of food
production on climate sensitive sectors with limited adaptation
to the daunting challenges it poses (Abidoye and Odusola
2015). Knox et al. (2012) project average yield reductions of
17% for wheat, 5% for maize, 15% for sorghum, and 10% for
millet in the African continent by 2050 because of climate
change. A higher frequency of drought will increase food
insecurity in areas where livelihoods are already precarious.
Mendelsohn (2008) argued that the most significant known
economic impact of climate change is upon agriculture, espe-
cially because farms in the low latitude countries already en-
dure climates that are too hot. Kurukulasuriya et al. (2006)
showed that warming is harmful to rain-fed farming in
Africa, and rain-fed and irrigated farms both benefit (lose) if
rainfall increases (falls). Swaziland’s trade ties with an eco-
nomically powerful neighbor –South Africa–can help cushion
some of the negative consequences of climate shocks
(Abidoye and Odusola 2015). However, these links do not
insulate the country from local price changes and shocks even
if they can import cereals from South Africa during droughts
as those droughts would lead to an increase in prices in the
whole region. Rural communities are more vulnerable to the
effects of climate change due to a lack of information on
7 Though this is called a household model, because of lack of availability of
data, many of the models are applied to enumeration area or district level.
8 The temperature data is minimum and maximummonthly averages between
1901 and 2009. Author’s calculation using data from Abidoye and Odusola
(2015).
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mitigation strategies and the financial capital to implement
them (Manyatsi et al. 2010).
The welfare impact of food price changes depends on the
structure of the economy and the nature of the products whose
prices change (Ivanic and Martin 2008; Hertel and Winters
2006; Ravallion and Lokshin 2005; Wodon and Zaman
2010; Demeke and Rashid 2012). For example, the severity
of the impact depends on the distribution of income and the
percentage of net buyers and sellers within the country
(Groom and Tak 2015; Ivanic andMartin 2008). It is expected
that with an increase in food prices, the pattern of food con-
sumption amongst households will change. Instead of con-
suming more, households will reduce consumption levels or
substitute food commodities towards cheaper goods. D'Souza
and Jolliffe (2012) point that we should look at smaller price
elasticities per calories rather than per food consumption as
most households tend to choose quantity over quality as they
shift from consuming highly nutritious food to staple food.
Net consumers of food are most likely the ones affected by
higher food prices, especially in urban areas where farming is
not practiced (Ravallion 1990; Ivanic and Martin 2008). Ruel
et al. (2009) contend that the 2006/7 price and fuel shocks
intensively affected the urban poor compared to the rural
poor. In a study on the negative impacts of higher food
prices in Ghana, Minot and Dewina (2015) stated that
female-headed households, who are net-buyers of food com-
modities, are the most affected by higher food prices com-
pared to male-headed households. This is a consequence of
less food production from female-headed households than
male-headed households. On the other hand, higher prices
are beneficial for households that are net producers, especially
in developing countries, where farmers can increase produc-
tion (Demeke and Rashid 2012). Hertel and Rosch (2010) and
Bellemare (2015) also indicate that increases in food prices
improve the welfare of net producers while reducing the wel-
fare of households whose consumption is higher than their
production. Countries/households that benefit most from price
decreases will lose most from price increases, although the net
impact may be affected by various policies (trade policy, tax-
es, etc.), by institutions, and by the industrial organization of
the food chain (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2010).
Finally, it is noted that in a general equilibrium framework,
labor market responses spurred by increasing agricultural
commodity prices can also produce positive income effects
for farming workers that mitigate the direct impact of the price
hikes on consumption (Ravallion 1990; Hertel and Rosch
2010). However, Banerjee (2007) cautions that climate
change could depress demand for labor depending on the se-
verity of natural disasters, further weakening the well-being of
impacted households.
It is clear from the literature that previous work has mostly
concentrated on the aggregate impact of climate change on the
agricultural sector as a whole or economic growth in general.
Few empirical studies have drilled down to the household
level factoring in both demand and supply of commodities
in rural and urban areas. We, therefore, examine empirically
the impact of climate change on the welfare of households in
Swaziland using IFPRI’s projected food prices to the year
2050 (Nelson et al. 2010) in light of the threat of climate
change.
3 Methods and data
A priori, a household that is a net buyer will experience a
welfare loss due to an increase in food prices.9 In quantifying
changes in welfare, this study follows Friedman and
Levinsohn (2002) in estimating the compensating variation
(CV), which measures the gain or loss in welfare in terms of
the amount of income transfer required for a household to stay
on its pre-price change indifference curve. In other words, CV
is the difference between the minimum expenditure necessary
to maintain the initial utility level at the new prices and the
initial expenditure. Using the IFPRI-calculated projected ce-
real price changes due to climate change, this study estimates
how worse off households become when they move from the
initial utility level to utility post-price changes.
Let c (p,u) denote the expenditure function, i.e., the mini-
mum amount of expenditure required to achieve a certain
utility level, u, at a given price vector p. Assume that prices
change from p0 to p1 as a result of the effects of climate
change. As mentioned above, the CV is the difference be-
tween the minimum expenditure required to maintain the ini-
tial utility level at the new prices and the initial expenditure.
Hence it is computed as:
CV ¼ c p1; u –c p0; u  ð1Þ
The CV can be approximated around initial prices using a
second-order Taylor expansion of the minimum expenditure
function as follows (see, e.g., Friedman and Levinsohn 2002):





ij ΔlnPi Δ lnP j ð2Þ
where wiis the budget share of commodity i in the initial pe-
riod (2009/10), Δ lnPi approximates the proportionate change
in the price of commodity i, and ε*ij is the compensated cross-
price elasticity. Eq. (2) indicates that the impact of a price
change can be decomposed into a first order and a second
order effect. The first order effect is a function of the
9 As discussed above, increases in agricultural commodity prices could trigger
a positive wage response in the long-run that dampens the negative spending-
related effect of the price increase (Hertel and Rosch 2010; Ravallion 1990).
However, in the presence of climate change this positive wage/income effect is
not guaranteed; climate change could potentially depress wages for workers
creating a “double-whammy” spending and income effect (Banerjee 2007).
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magnitude of the proportionate price change and the relative
importance of different food groups in the household’s con-
sumption basket (captured by the budget shares). It is a mea-
sure of the proportionate change in expenditure needed to
maintain pre-change utility levels when substitution between
food commodities is not possible. As such, the first order
effect generally overstates the compensating variation. The
second order effect takes into account the fact that households
will substitute away from the relatively more expensive good
to the cheaper alternatives. The substitution effect is captured
by the product between cross-price elasticities of demand and
the budget shares. We implement the Almost Ideal Demand
System (AIDS) (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980), which is one
of the most widely accepted and estimated demand systems in
the applied economics literature to estimate the matrix of
cross-price compensated elasticities, which we then use to
approximate the compensating variation.10
Let wi denote i
th commodity budget share, the AIDS is
specified as:





log P ¼ α0 þ ∑nk¼1αk logpk þ § ∑k ∑ j γkj log pk logp j ð4Þ
where x is food expenditure, the pj’s are food prices, αi, γij,
and βi are parameters to be estimated and P is the trans loga-
rithmic price index; thus xP stands for the real expenditure.
To estimate the AIDS model, we use the 2009/2010
Household and Income Survey data collected by the Central
Statistics Office (Central Statistics Office 2011) from 375 enu-
merated areas of the Kingdom of Swaziland. The survey is
national in nature with financial and technical assistance pro-
vided by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and the Accelerated Data Program that also provided
technical support.11While the survey was initially designed to
be conducted every 5 years, it has not been implemented since
2009/10, according to the government’s website.12 The study
used the 2007 population census to locate enumeration areas
and the primary sampling units. A two-stage stratification
sampling method was incorporated in the surveys across both
rural and urban settlements, cutting through all the ecological,
administrative, land distribution, and tenure features (CSO
2011). Our final sample is comprised of 3143 households
and captures information on both the production and con-
sumption of food products.
Given the broad nature of the food categories, we group the
food commodities in five food bundles, as is standard practice
in models similar to ours (e.g., Molina 1994; Agbola 2003).
For instance, Agbola (2003), in estimating food demand for
South Africa, grouped the food items into meat and fish,
grains, dairy products, fruits, vegetables, and other foods.
Our classification of the food items is closer to that of
Agbola (2003), given the similarities in culture across the
two countries. We categorize the food items into five groups,
namely: (1) cereals, roots, and tubers, (2) vegetables, legumes
and nuts, (3) fruits, (4) meat, eggs, fish and dairy products, and
(5) other food products. Vegetables and fruits are not
combined in line with Agbola (2003) and based on the way
food is typically made in Swaziland. Pepper/chili, spinach,
and tomatoes, for instance, are consumed with fresh peas,
beans, and other nuts. Table 1 details the composition of food
commodities found in each food group.
To estimate the demand equation, the annual prices, annual
expenditure, and annual budget shares of the five food groups
were used. For the annual prices, the total expenditure values
given by households on a specific item are used and divided
by the number of items bought. The price was then multiplied
by 12 to annualize and estimate the change of price over
12 months. For the commodity group prices, the price within
the group is weighted by the total number of the items con-
sumed in that group.
Per share statistics in Table 2, the cereals, root and tubers
and meat, eggs, fish, and dairy product groups are the two
most important food groups, accounting respectively for
31.46 and 25.14% of food expenditure. The cereal category
consists mostly of maize, the staple food of Swaziland.
Vegetables, legumes and nuts represent 20.47% and fruits
represent 10.17% of food expenditure, while the remaining
combined category accounts for 12.77%.13
The food consumption expenditures in the survey were
collected in a series of diary modules filled daily by household
members over a maximum period of 7 days. The diary was
also used for “goods and services received” and “own-pro-
duce consumption.” However, despite the detailed diary of
data, some food items were not purchased by the household.
Per Table 3, the food expenditure share remained stable
between the survey rounds of 2000/01 and 2009/10, respec-
tively 21.5% and 21.4% of the total household expenditure.
10 Several studies have used the AIDSmodel to estimate demand. Lazaro et al.
(2017) use it to study the price elasticities of imported vs domestic rice in
Tanzania; Grant et al. (2010) study the demand for fresh tomatoes in North
America; Wadud (2006) analyse meat demand in Bangladesh; Abdulai (2002)
estimate household demand for food in Switzerland; and Chang et al. (2011)
study organic milk purchase behaviour in Ohio.
11 The data was obtained from the statistics office in Eswatini but can also be
downloaded from the International Households Survey Network, https://
catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/4599.




13 As is typical of many developing countries especially in the rural areas,
many households grow their own fruits and vegetables and may not necessar-
ily spend money buying them even though they may be an important compo-
nent of their food demand.
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However, the share of “food received,” primarily from food
baskets from development aid programs, increased signifi-
cantly from 2000/01 to 2009/10. Even with the grouping of
the data into food categories, none of the five groups was
purchased by all households sampled, resulting in zero expen-
diture. Zero expenditure, in this case, does not mean zero
consumption; it simply means that the household did not pur-
chase the product during the survey period either because the
household produced the good, received it as a gift, survey
period (7 days) being too short or because of household
preferences.
If unaccounted for econometrically, zero expenditure
leads to biased and inconsistent elasticity estimates (Sam
and Zheng 2010) due to censored response bias. We,
therefore, implement a consistent two-stage estimator
(Shonkwiler and Yen 1999; Sam and Zheng 2010) to
circumvent this issue. The first stage consists of estimat-
ing a binary single-index model for each commodity to
predict its probability of consumption. Suppose we have L
household observations on each commodity and suppose
that the probability of consuming commodity i by house-
hold l is a function of control variables z
0
il and a normally
distributed error termvil. That is dil ¼ I z0ilδi þ vil > 0
 
where dil is a binary variable that equals one if commod-
ity group i is consumed by household l, zero otherwise;
I(.) is an indicator function and δi a parameter vector. To
account for the censoring of the commodities, the predict-
ed probabilities of consumption Φ(z'iδi)and inverse mills
ratios φ z0ið δiÞΦ z0 ið δiÞ are computed for each commodity
group from the first stage probit and added nonlinearly
to the AIDS equation as follows:
Table 1 Composition of food
aggregation on consumed food
commodities in Swaziland
Food groups Food items
Cereals, roots and tubers Cereal: white bread, brown bread, breakfast cereals, biscuits, cake, wheat flour,
mealie meal (imphuphu), mealie rice, mabele meal, samp (sitambu),
spaghetti/macaroni, sorghum meal, rice, other bread, green-mealie and cereals.
Roots and tubers: cassava, potatoes, sweet potatoes and other starchy tubers.
Vegetables, legumes and
nuts
Beetroot, cabbage, carrot, garlic, green pepper, lettuce, mushrooms, okra, onions,
pumpkin leaves, pumpkin and squashes, pepper/chili, spinach, tomatoes, ginger,
turnips, radish, tinned vegetables, fresh peas, beans, other dried vegetables,
frozen vegetables and other fresh vegetables, round nuts, peanuts/groundnuts,
other nuts.
Fruits Apples, oranges, bananas, grapes, avocados, lemon/lime, mangoes, pawpaw,
peaches, pears, pineapple, plums, strawberries, other fresh fruit, tinned fruits and
dried fruits.
Meat, fish, eggs and dairy
products
Meat: beef, chicken, turkey, pork, fish, sausages, bacon, polony, ham, goat meat,
mutton, game, rough tripe, offals (ematfumbu), dried / smoked fish, canned or
tinned fish, and other meat.
Dairy: fresh milk, sour milk, skimmed milk, powdered milk, other milk, cheese,
cream., eggs, yoghurt/sip.
Other food products Sugar: glucose, sugar granules, candy sweets, other sweets, syrups and other
sweets.
Oils and fats: butter, peanut butter, lard/dripping, holsum, cooking oil, margarine,
other vegetable oil, other oil and fat.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SHIES (2009/2010)
Table 2 Total consumption
expenditure by households and
share of households that consume
each food group in Swaziland
Food group Expenditure share Percentage of households
with non-zero expenditure
Cereals, roots, and tubers 31.46 95.04%
Vegetables, legumes and nuts 20.47 81.39
Fruits 10.17 56
Meat, fish, eggs and dairy products 25.14 88.26
Other food products 12.77 81.61
Total 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SHIES (2009/2010)
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CAþ ζi; i ¼ 1;……n
ð5Þ
As commonly done, the five censored AIDS equations are
estimated as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions.14
The expenditure and uncompensated (Marshallian) elasticities
are calculated from the parameters of the AIDSmodel, respec-
tively, as follows: ei = 1+Φi
βi
w where Φi is the estimated prob-
abili ty of consuming food category, and ei j = Φi
γij−βi w j−β j*log xPð Þ½ 
wi
 
− sij where sij is a dummy that equals
1 if i = j; 0 otherwise (Sam and Zheng 2010).
4 Results
Before discussing the results, we present summary sta-
tistics of the key variables in the model in Table 4. The
average household size is about 5, and household heads
are about 45 years old on average. The sample has more
male (55%) than female household heads and is more
rural (56.5%) than urban. On average, households spend
a significant share of their food expenditure on Cereals,
root and tubers and Meat, fish, eggs, and dairy. Fruits
have the lowest share of household food expenditure.
The food group made of meat, fish, eggs, and dairy prod-
ucts is produced by most households (54%), while fruits
a re only produced by 10% of the households .
Commodity group prices are obtained as a weighted av-
erage price of the food components for each group with
the individual commodity expenditures serving as
weights.
In addition to the summary statistics at the national
level, we also present summary statistics by region
(Table 5). Household size, for instance, is highest in the
Shisel region of the country at 5.4 people per household.
The second highest average household size is in Lubomb
region at about 4.6 people per household; in contrast,
Hhohho has the smallest average household size at 4.0.
There is also heterogeneity in the level of prices across
the regions based on the combination of commodities in
each group. For instance, Lubomb region has the highest
annual average price (SZL/Kg.) for group 1 foods (ce-
reals, roots, and tubers) at 1.32 SZL/Kg but with more
substantial variation in the prices. Prices are lower in
Hhohho region, and the standard deviation is also lower.
In terms of production of the different food categories, it
can be seen from Fig. 1 that households in the Shisel
region produce the highest percentage of meat, cereal,
vegetable, and fruit products which likely leads to lower
consumption expenditure on these goods in this region
relative to the other areas. Cereal production by house-
holds is about the same in the other three regions, but
Luhomb is the second producer of fruit and vegetable
products.
4.1 First stage results
The IFPRI price projections used in the analysis are con-
ducted at a global level based on the price of mostly
consumed food crops such as cereals (maize, wheat, and
rice). The projections were from 2010 to 2050, a period of
40 years. Unlike Nelson et al. (2009), which projected
future outcomes of climate change and price increases
using only GDP and population, these projections utilized
a combination of income and population growth to esti-
mate the outcomes in 3 scenarios: a baseline scenario to
represent the most likely outcome of status quo income
and population growth, an optimistic scenario that is like-
ly to result in low population and high-income growth
rates, and a pessimistic scenario with more negative out-
comes for human well-being with high population and
low-income growth rates. Each of these scenarios is sub-
jected to five plausible climate futures that range from
slightly to substantially wetter and hotter on average than
the current climate representative concentration pathways
14 To estimate the first and second stage of the AIDS model, we include
several demographic variables of the households in addition to prices: age
and gender of the household head, a dummy indicating if the household resides
in a rural or urban area, five dummies indicating if the household produces
each of the five food categories listed in Table 1, and dummies representing the
three of the four regions of Swaziland (Hhohho, Manzini, Shiselweni and
Lubombo). For identification purposes, the first stage includes an additional
variable that is not in the second stage: income decile (Sam and Zheng 2010).
We follow Pudney (1989) and other studies in the consumer demand literature
such as Lazaro et al. (2017), Bilgic and Yen (2013), Yen and Lin (2006) in not
including prices and food expenditure in the probit but we include total house-
hold income in the form of income deciles. Omitting prices in the Probit
equations is a reasonable approach when the zero purchases are driven by
non-price factors such as shortness of the survey period, availability of the
goods, or inherent household preferences.
Table 3 Household expenditure structure, 2000/01 vs. 2009/10
SHIES 2000/01 2009/10
Food 27.2 30.7
Food purchased 21.5 21.4
Food own produced and consumed 3.6 4.2
Food received 2.1 5.1
Non-food 72.8 69.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Swaziland HIES 2009–2010 poverty report, Poverty in a decade
of slow economic growth: Swaziland in the 2000’s
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of low, medium, and high GHG emissions.15 The IFPRI
projected prices are based on climate change projections
that are also typically based on average projected changes
in precipitation and temperature up to either 2050, 2070,
or 2100. The paper (Nelson et al. 2010) presented the
projections for the 2050 average. Based on IPCC’s
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), climate
change is given as a warming average for the period
2011 to 2030 compared to say 1980 to 1999. Thus the
estimate is not a series of changes in climate over time but
discrete values of the average. This average change in
temperature and precipitation was used n the IFPRI paper
to model price changes due to climate change. The price
changes used in the welfare analysis are based on
projected changes in one food category - cereal. The
IFPRI projected prices covered three commodities: maize,
15 Three overall scenarios, under five climate scenarios, result in 15 perspec-
tives on the future that encompass a wide range of plausible outcomes. Using
the baseline scenario, they experimented with a variety of crop productivity
enhancement simulations.
Table 4 Demographic and other
variables used to estimate
parameters in the demand system
Variable Description Mean Standard
deviation
Region Hhohho, Shiselweni, Manzini and Lubombo
Location Urban/Rural 0.5651 0.4958
Hhsize Household size 4.4747 3.2759
Head age Age of the household head 4 44.9857 15.7680
Head
gender
Male (1) or Female (0) household member .5476 0.4978
Ann_hh_
exp1










Annual household expenditure (SZL) of food group 3 (Fruits) 4684.88 11,944.17
Ann_hh_
exp4
Annual household expenditure (SZL) of food group 4 (Meat, fish,




Annual household expenditure (SZL) of other food products, food
group5(Oils, fats, sugar, and syrups)
12,185.89 21,036.05
P1 Annual price (SZL/Kg.) of food group 1 (Cereals, roots, and tubers) 0.9335 4.2436
P2 Annual price (SZL/Kg.) of food group 2 (Vegetables, legumes and
nuts)
0.6001 6.0199
P3 Annual price (SZL/Kg.) of food group 3 (Fruits) 0.3608 4.2391
P4 Annual price (SZL/Kg.) of food group 4 (Meat, fish, eggs and dairy
products)
10.3260 103.5306
P5 Annual price (SZL/Kg.) of other food products, food group5(Oils,
fats, sugar and syrups)
2.1566 31.7364
dumprod1 Dummy variable =1 if hh produces Cereals and 0 otherwise. 0.4480 0.4974
dumprod2 Dummy variable =1 if hh produces Vegetables and 0 otherwise. 0.2167 0.4120
dumprod3 Dummy variable =1 if hh produces Fruits and 0 otherwise. 0.1075 0.3098
dumprod4 Dummy variable =1 if hh produces Meat and 0 otherwise. 0.5409 0.4984
dumprod5 Dummy variable =1 if hh produces Others and 0 otherwise. 0.1473 0.3545
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SHIES (2009/2010)
Table 5 Summary statistics of demographic variables by region
Mean Standard deviation
Hhohho
Household size 4.002 2.900
Age of the household head 43.791 15.293
Head gender 0.581 0.494
Lubomb
Household size 4.599 3.236
Age of the household head 45.229 14.773
Head gender 0.577 0.494
Manzin
Household size 4.383 3.321
Age of the household head 43.724 15.159
Head gender 0.561 0.490
Shisel
Household size 5.401 3.699
Age of the household head 49.427 18.019
Head gender 0.422 0.494
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from SHIES (2009/2010)
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rice, and wheat. These three commodities add up to about
58% of annual food expenditure in Swaziland.
The results of the first stage probit estimations can be
found in Table 6. In the first stage, we estimate the like-
lihood of choosing each of the food categories by a
household. The dependent variables in these equations
are dichotomous variables that take the value 1 if the
household makes a purchase and zero otherwise. In addi-
tion to income (deciles) and food prices, the probit models
also control for the effects of several household charac-
teristics on the probability of consumption. Estimated co-
efficients on the income decile, household size, and re-
gion 2 (Hhohho) are positive and significant for all food
groups and significant at 1% level. The income decile
coefficient is highly significant at 1% level and positive,
indicating that the higher the income level, the higher
one’s consumption level of each food group, especially
the cereals, roots, and tubers category. The coefficient
on the location variable indicates that rural households
consume fewer meats and vegetables than urban house-
holds. The gender coefficient indicates that male-headed
households consume less cereal and vegetables than
female-headed households. Residents of the Manzini,
Hhohho, and Shiselweni regions are significantly more
likely to consume the food categories than residents of
the Lubombo region (omitted to avoid perfect collineari-
ty), which has lower crop yields. It is important to note
that the first stage only serves to correct for potential
censoring bias in the main parameters of interest (second
stage), hence the lack of emphasis on the results.
4.2 Second stage results
Table 7 presents the second-stage parameter estimates of the
censored AIDS model. The results show that all price and
expenditure parameters and most of the parameters for the
demographic variables are significant. All five inverse mills
ratio coefficients are statistically significant, indicating the
statistical necessity to account for the censoring of the
commodities.
Since these coefficients do not lend themselves to a direct
economic interpretation, we focus our discussion on the elas-
ticity estimates instead. Table 8 presents expenditure shares
and expenditure elasticities for the five food commodities,
given at means. The results indicate that all the commodities
are normal goods, consumption of which will increase with an
increase in income. Overall, the results show price elasticities
below 1.0 for cereals (0.9560), vegetables, legumes and nuts
(0.8368), and fruits (0.7984). This indicates that these food
groups are relatively income inelastic. On the other hand, the
expenditure elasticities for meats and dairy (1.0561) and the
other food group (which includes sugars, fats, and oils)
(1.1738) suggest that they are luxury goods.
Price elasticities quantify the responsiveness of quantity
demanded to a change in prices. As illustrated in the approx-
imation of the CV equation, they are an essential input to the
formulation of tax or subsidy policies designed to mitigate
consumer welfare loss spurred by adverse price changes.
Uncompensated elasticities measure households’ adjustment
of quantities consumed as a result of a price change; as such,
they reflect both income and substitution effects induced by
the change in price. Compensated elasticities, on the other
hand, measure only the substitution effect of a price change
when consumers are compensated just enough to stay on their
pre-price change utility level.
Uncompensated and compensated elasticities from the
AIDS model, evaluated at the mean sample of the data, are
reported in Table 9 in matrix form with rows and columns
composed of the five food groups: (1) cereals, roots, and tu-
bers, (2) vegetables, legumes, and nuts, (3) fruits, (4) meat,
fish, eggs and dairy products and (5) other foods, respectively.
A few observations are worthy of a brief discussion. First, all
elasticities are less than unity in absolute value, indicating that
the food groups are not very sensitive to changes in prices.










Hhohho Lubomb Manzin Shisel
Cereals Prod Vegetable Prod Fruits Prod Meat Prod Other Food Prod
Fig. 1 Percentage of households
producing each of the commodity
groups. Source: Authors’
calculations based on data from
SHIES (2009/2010)
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Second, all compensated and uncompensated own-price elas-
ticities of consumed commodities are negative and statistically
different from zero as expected and consistent with the law of
demand. Third, the estimated income effect is significant giv-
en the sizable differences between the compensated and un-
compensated elasticities in general. For example, a 1% in-
crease in the price of cereals leads to a 0.1386% decline in
the demand for meats (uncompensated elasticity) when the
income effect is considered. With no income effect, the same
price change leads to a 0.1973% increase in the demand for
meats due to a pure substitution effect to the relatively cheaper
commodity. The size of the income effect is further evidenced
by the fact that there are several gross complements (uncom-
pensated elasticities) but net substitutes (compensated elastic-
ities). We now turn to the welfare analysis to examine how
consumers would fare if the projected price increases due to
climate change were to materialize.
4.3 Welfare analysis
To gauge the price effects of climate change on household
welfare, we used the same scenarios from IFPRI’s food price
projections to the year 2050 (Nelson et al. 2010). The use of
scenarios is essential for climate change modeling because of
the uncertainty about future economic development and hu-
man activities. The IFPRI food price projections were devel-
oped based on the original climate scenarios used in the SRES
of the third IPCC assessment.16 From the SRES, individual
scenarios are grouped into families depending on assumptions
around future population, GDP, and GDP per capita. For the
IFPRI price projections and, consequently, welfare estimates
in this paper, the scenarios A1B, A2, and B1 form the basis for
the optimistic and pessimistic price projections. The popula-
tion, GDP, and GDP per capita estimates from the SRES were
updated by IFPRI to capture the 2010–2050 period (see
Table A2.1 in Nelson et al. 2010).
As done in the IFPRI study, we consider three cases: the
baseline or most likely case, an optimistic case with high
income and low population growth and pessimistic case
16 See www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/emission/index.php?idp=0. The SRES
scenarios are “baseline” (or “reference”) scenarios, which means that they do
not take into account any current or future measures to limit greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions (e.g., the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change). The IPCC did not state that any of the SRES
scenarios were more likely to occur than others. Therefore, none of the SRES
scenarios stand for a “best guess” of future emissions.
Table 6 Probit model explaining the likelihood of consuming each of the food groups
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cereals Vegetables Fruits Meats Other
Decile 0.2152*** 0.1017*** 0.1731*** 0.1788*** 0.0472***
(0.0188) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0134) (0.0113)
Head age −0.0048* 0.0007 −0.0023 −.0068*** −0.0006
(0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Head gender −0.1657* −.1699*** −0.0693 0.0175 −0.0792
(0.0892) (0.0551) (0.0481) (0.0653) (0.0550)
Hhsize 0.1484*** 0.0768*** 0.0803*** 0.1196*** 0.0995***
(0.0195) (0.0108) (0.0091) (0.0131) (0.0115)
Location −0.0285 −.2306*** −0.0508 −.2514*** −0.0520
(0.1273) (0.0728) (0.0641) (0.0907) (0.0710)
Hhohho 0.0082 0.2887*** 0.2896*** 0.1325 0.1393*
(0.1141) (0.0744) (0.0671) (0.0859) (0.0739)
Manzini 0.2779** 0.1818** 0.3150*** 0.2685*** 0.1501**
(0.1282) (0.0744) (0.0680) (0.0900) (0.0753)
Shiselweni −0.0843 0.2453*** 0.4274*** 0.2458** 0.4140***
(0.1324) (0.0887) (0.0797) (0.1028) (0.0958)
dumprod1 −0.2370** 0.0239 −0.1128* −0.0996 0.1686**
(0.1144) (0.0718) (0.0644) (0.0838) (0.0734)
dumprod2 −0.0553 0.1132 0.0078 −0.0746 0.0610
(0.1145) (0.0758) (0.0655) (0.0853) (0.0799)
dumprod3 0.2629* 0.2479** −0.0918 0.0338 0.0499
(0.1523) (0.0974) (0.0812) (0.1054) (0.1010)
dumprod 4 −0.1974* −0.0186 −0.0233 −0.2388 −0.0293
(0.1093) (0.0674) (0.0601) (0.0823) (0.0665)
dumprod5 −0.0295 −0.2066** 0.0865 0.1031 0.0247
(0.1320) (0.0850) (0.0753) (0.0994) (0.0926)
Constant 0.2322 −0.0955 −1.3857*** −0.0290 0.0455
(0.2226) (0.1434) (0.1310) (0.1680) (0.1453)
Observations 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** for p value <0.01%, ** for p value <0.05, and * for p value <0.1
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Table 7 AIDS model estimates (Eq. 5)
Food groups























































































































































































Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** for p value <0.01%, ** for p value <0.05, and * for p value <0.1. The sij’s are the coefficients on the
demographic variables. Included, in this order: head age, head gender, hhsize, location (1 = rural), region1, region2, region 3, dumprod1, dumprod2,
dumprod3, dumprod4, dumprod5. The theta_dj are the IMR coefficients. Once for each category. They are highly significant indicating the importance
of accounting for the zero observations
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Notes: *** for p value <0.01%, ** for p value <0.05, and * for p value <0.1.We follow standard practice (see e.g.,
Bilgic and Yen 2013; Sam 2010b) and report bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses) instead of second-
stage standard errors due to the use of a predicted regressor (inverse Mills ratio) and the predicted probability of
consumption
Table 8 Expenditure elasticities
and expenditure shares for
purchased food commodities
Variable Expenditure share Expenditure elasticity
Cereals/ roots and tubers 0.3572 0.9560***
(0.0100)




Meat, fish, eggs and dairy products 0.3514 1.0561***
(0.0102)
Other food products 0.1341 1.1738***
(0.0257)
Notes: *** for p value <0.01%, ** for p value <0.05, and * for p value <0.1.We follow standard practice (see e.g.
Bilgic and Yen 2013; Sam 2010b) and report bootstrapped standard errors (in parentheses) instead of second-
stage standard errors due to the use of a predicted regressor (inverse Mills ratio) and the predicted probability of
consumption
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with low income and high population growth rate. We use
data from Table 2.2 of Nelson et al. (2010) for these three
scenarios to come up with projected prices increases that re-
flect consumption patterns in Swaziland for the cereal group
only.17 Cereal prices are expected to rise by 70.14%, 53.85%,
and 82.1%, respectively in the baseline (most likely), optimis-
tic and pessimistic cases by 2050, relative to 2010 baseline
prices.
We combine the projected price increases mentioned above
with the budget shares of the five commodity groups and their
compensated price elasticities to estimate the first and second-
order components of the compensating variation (Eq. 2).
Table 10 presents the results of the welfare analysis for the
three scenarios based on changes in the prices ofmaize, wheat,
and rice (cereal group).
Two key observations emerge from the welfare estimation.
First, the proportionate increase in income required to main-
tain pre-price change utilities is roughly the same across the
income distribution as well as between urban and rural resi-
dents (unlike Friedman and Levinsohn (2002)). The estimated
compensation variation figures indicate that climate spurred-
increases in cereal prices are expected to lead to a significant
worsening of well-being among Swazi consumers, income
transfers of between 17.48 and 25.44% of pre-change expen-
diture are needed to avoid welfare losses depending on the
price projection scenario. Swazi households are likely to ex-
perience even higher welfare losses due to increases in the
prices of the other food categories, which for this analysis
are held constant. Meat and dairy prices are likely to rise due
to drier climate conditions and therefore reduced pasture for
meat production.
Second, compared to the baseline (current) poverty rates,
we find that the projected increases in cereal prices will result
in a significant rise in poverty in the absence of an intervention
to mitigate the consequences of the price increases. Per the
survey data, many Swazi households live under SZL461
(about $63 based on the exchange rate at the time of the sur-
vey) per adult per month. This translates into a 100% poverty
rate for 63% for all households that are in the 1st to the 6th
household income deciles. The poverty rate declines to 28% at
the 7th decile, and it is zero from the 8th to 10th decile. A
100% extreme poverty rate (below SZL215.00 per adult per
month) is observed for the two lowest deciles, and it declines
to 87.4% for households in the third decile and zeroes for all
other deciles. 63% (28%) of rural residents are classified as
poor (extremely poor), with 25% (4%) of urban residents clas-
sified as such.
With the estimated compensating variation figures, we cal-
culated the new poverty rates that would prevail if the
projected price increases were to materialize based on the
current national poverty (SZL 462 a day per adult) and ex-
treme poverty (SZL 125) levels. Doing so, we find a drastic
increase in both poverty measures across the income distribu-
tion with 94.6% of households in decile 7 (compared to 28%
with no price change) and 29.1% of households in decile 8
(compared to 0%with no price change) classified as “poor” in
the most likely scenario. Extreme poverty is expected to in-
crease similarly, going from zero to 84% and 23% for house-
holds in the fourth- and fifth-income deciles, respectively.
Table 11 further summarizes the estimated welfare effects.
While urban households are expected to experience faster
growth in poverty compared to rural households (between a
33 and 51% growth in the poverty rate), poverty rates for rural
households are expected to increase to alarming levels (be-
tween 70 and 74%). Extreme poverty is expected to double
in urban areas though it will remain a small fraction compared
to extreme poverty in rural areas (8.59% vs. 40.78% in the
most likely scenario). The combination of the results in the
urban and rural areas indicates that climate change is expected
to have severe consequences for the well-being of households
in developing countries with poorer rural households bearing
the brunt of it.
5 Discussion
Our results show that Swazi households, especially those liv-
ing in rural areas, could experience a significant deterioration
in living standards if the IFPRI-projected climate scenarios
were to materialize. Absent any intervention to mitigate the
effect of food price increases, poverty rates are expected to
increase by ten percentage points, up from 25 and 63%, re-
spectively, in urban and rural areas. Likewise, extreme pover-
ty is expected to double in urban areas but affect a relatively
small fraction of residents (from 4 to nearly 9%) in the most
likely scenario. In rural areas, extreme poverty is expected to
rise from 28 to 41% in the most likely scenario. Besides the
documented negative effect on poverty, a significant increase
in food prices has the potential to generate violence and social
unrest, as evidenced by Bellemare (2015). Climate change
could also accentuate the volatility of agricultural production
and prices, leading to increased risks for producers, con-
sumers, and governments alike (Li et al. 2017; Sam 2010a).
As mentioned above, a spate of papers have studied the
links between food prices and poverty. Three of these are
closely related to ours. Dessus et al. (2008) conclude that a
growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) between 0.2 and
3% is required to offset the effect of increased food prices on
urban poverty. Simulations byHertel et al. (2010) indicate that
a rapid rise in global temperatures, combined with high
17 The IFPRI projected prices are not country specific. We therefore adapt the
projections to broad consumption patterns in Swaziland by weighting the
projected price increases for Maize, Rice and Wheat with their expenditure
percentages from our survey data. Unfortunately, the projected price changes
did not include the other food categories considered in the analysis. They are
therefore set to zero for the purpose of the welfare analysis.
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sensitivity of crops to heat and a low level of CO2 fertilization
effect could result in as much as a 60% increase in prices by
2030 for major cereal crops. Such price increases are expected
to raise the poverty rate by between 20 and 50% among non-
agricultural households in some SSA countries. The estimated
impacts on poverty take into account both the adverse change
in the cost of living, which primarily affects urban wage
earners, as well as a positive change in incomes (higher food
prices due to reduced production and inelasticity of food de-
mand) that mostly accrue to rural farmers. Similarly, simula-
tions by Seaman et al. (2014) indicate that a 50% drop in
agricultural output and increase in food prices will lead to a
significant increase in the number of people below the poverty
line in Salima, Malawi, and a substantial drop in disposable
income in the Northern Border Upland Cereal and Livestock
Zone in Namibia among the poor and very poor, potentially
leading to migration from rural to urban areas.
Unlike our paper, Dessus et al. (2008) did not focus on the
impact of climate change, and the other two papers use simu-
lation methods to generate their results. Instead, we adopt an
econometric approach based on a popular microeconometric
food demand model (AIDS) to study the impact of climate
change on poverty at the household level. Despite the differ-
ence in analytical approaches, our results are broadly consis-
tent with the findings of these papers: climate change spurred
shocks to food prices could have debilitating consequences on
the welfare of many households in SSA.
It should be stressed that our methodology does not fully
capture the effects of increasing food prices due to climate
change on food consumption. First, higher food prices gener-
ate a beneficial income effect for rural households whose in-
come primarily emanates from agriculture (Dessus et al.
2008). That said, a large proportion–a majority in some
countries–of food producers are net food buyers (Barrett and
Lentz 2010; Jayne et al. 1999), hence will be adversely im-
pacted by higher food prices without an attendant increase in
income. The trend toward more urbanization in SSA is likely
to magnify the household welfare losses discussed above.
Second, increases in agricultural commodity prices could trig-
ger a positive wage response that dampens the negative
spending-related effect of the price increase (Hertel and
Rosch 2010; Ravallion 1990). However, Banerjee (2007)
Table 10 Analysis of welfare effects due to an increase in cereal prices by household income decile
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Baseline poverty rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.28 0 0 0
Baseline extreme poverty rate 1 1 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Compensating variation 0.2128 0.2123 0.2304 0.2255 0.2237 0.2170 0.2228 0.2294 0.2245 0.2172
Most likely New poverty rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9461 0.2914 0 0
New extreme poverty rate 1 1 1 0.8450 0.2281 0.0115 0.0084 0 0 0
Optimistic Compensating variation 0.1684 0.1680 0.1822 0.1783 0.1766 0.1713 0.1757 0.1810 0.1771 0.1714
New poverty rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8989 0.1285 0 0
New extreme poverty rate 1 1 1 0.6556 0.0953 0 0 0 0 0
Pessimistic Compensating variation 0.2430 0.2422 0.2632 0.2576 0.2558 0.2483 0.2550 0.2626 0.2569 0.2485
New poverty rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9570 0.4336 0.0116 0
New extreme poverty rate 1 1 1 0.8901 0.3807 0.0234 0.0164 0.0034 0 0
Table 11 Analysis of welfare
effects due to an increase in cereal
prices for rural and urban
households
Most likely Optimistic Pessimistic
Compensating variation 0.2224 0.1755 0.2544
Baseline poverty rate 0.2534 0.2534 0.2534
Urban New poverty rate 0.3589 0.3360 0.3833
Baseline extreme poverty rate 0.0408 0.0408 0.0408
New extreme poverty rate 0.0859 0.0740 0.0952
Compensating variation 0.2214 0.1748 0.2531
Baseline poverty rate 0.6314 0.6314 0.6314
Rural New poverty rate 0.7312 0.7071 0.7473
Baseline extreme poverty rate 0.2815 0.2815 0.2815
New extreme poverty rate 0.4078 0.3705 0.4319
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notes that such a positive wage response is not likely to ma-
terialize; instead, climate change could reduce wages for
workers, creating a “double-whammy” spending and income
effect. Finally, our welfare analysis rests on simulated changes
in the prices of cereals only; further empirical research is
needed to shed more light on the comprehensive effects of
climate change on household welfare.
6 Conclusion
Climate change has become a subject of serious concern in
Africa because of its potentially devastating effect on agricul-
ture, the primary source of food production in the region. Our
empirical estimates, based on household survey data from
Swaziland, suggest that there is reason to be alarmed about
its effects on poverty in SSA countries. Policy-wise, several
actions can be taken to minimize the effects of climate change
on household welfare. For example, international aid agencies
and/or SSA governments could incentivize the adoption of
climate resilient techniques and sustainable food security by
training farmers on climate smart agricultural practices and
providing subsidies to purchase inputs that tare are better suit-
ed for extreme weather patterns such as heat or drought resis-
tant seeds to boost agricultural productivity (Onyutha 2019).
Such policies should be coupled with better integration of
rural food markets to regional and national markets. Doing
so could motivate rural producers to increase food production,
which in turn should minimize food price inflation.
Households are also likely to adapt to the changing climate
by diversifying income generating activities (Diiro and Sam
2015). Finally, SSA governments could keep price increases
in check by reducing tariffs and other taxes on staple foods
such as maize. Together, these policies could substantially
mitigate the adverse effects of climate change on food prices
and household welfare.
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